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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD WILSON AMMERMAN, 
by his Guardian ad Litem, La Verne 
Bruce Ammerman, and EDDIE 
SOLIZ, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No.10,574 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by Eddie Soliz, the 
judgment creditor, and Edward Wilson Ammerman, 
the judgment debtor, in a previous action against the 
insurer, Farmers Insurance Exchange, to recover the 
amount of money by which a judgment secured by 
Eddie Soliz against Edward 'Wilson Ammerman ex-
ceeds the policy limits of a policy of insurance issued 
by the defendant and appellant herein, upon the 
theory that the defendant and appellant herein was 
guilty of bad faith in failing to settle the lawsuit 
brought by Soliz against Ammerman for $9,000.00 
prior to the trial of that action or for $10,000.00 at 
the time of the trial. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOVIER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and 
judgment in favor of both plaintiffs the defendant 
appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment and 
judgment in its favor as a matter of law or, that fail-
ing, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The case out of which this case grows, Soliz v. 
Ammerman, was previously before this court. See 
Soliz v. Ammerman, 16 Utah (2d) 11, 395 Pac. (2d) 
25. In order to understand the issues in this case 
a brief review of some of the facts of that action is 
necessary. 
On March 21, 1962 at about 8 :15 A.M. the plain-
tiffs herein were involved in an automobile accident 
at the intersection of Second West Street and 200 
North Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. Plaintiff Soliz 
was examined shortly after that accident by Dr. 
David E. Smith, Jr., who found no injuries other 
than minor cuts and bruises (Soliz Dep. 13). Dr. 
Smith had treated Soliz on two occasions prior to the 
accident for complaints of low back pain and numb-
ness in his right arm. This prior treatment was not 
known to defendant until it was brought out in testi-
mony during the trial (R. 189, 214). Prior to the 
trial Soliz in his deposition, taken by the defendant 
Farmers, had not disclosed this prior trouble when 
2 
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asked if he had had prior illnesses (R. 213). Subse-
quent to the accident Soliz complained of low back 
pain and neck pain to Dr. Smith, who thereafter re-
ferred him to Dr. Irwin F. Winters for x-rays. Dr. 
'i\Tinters' report indicated no abnormality. Soliz was 
then referred to Dr. D. C. Bernson, a neurosurgeon, 
who made his first examination on May 23, 1962 
and reported Soliz' systems to be all within normal 
limits and found him well developed, nourished, 
healthy and not in any acute distress nor suffering 
from illness ( Exh 7). Dr. Bernson examined the 
x-rays taken by Dr. Winters and had additional x-
rays taken by Dr. Winters, who reported them as be-
ing normal. Dr. Bernson agreed that the x-rays were 
essentially normal, but did feel some slight increase 
in motion of the 5th and 6th cervical vertebrae was 
indicated by the last x-rays (Exh. 7). Soliz was ex-
amined again on June 20, 1962 and August 4, 1962, 
during which time Dr. Bernson noted a change in 
grip strength and reflexes, but could find no other 
changes in Soliz' condition (Exh. 7). Soliz was then 
advised by Dr. Bernson to enter the hospital for a dis-
cogram, which he did on September 24, 1962. Based 
upon his clinical observations and the results of the 
discogram (which Dr. Bernson notes was administer-
ed with insufficient dye) he concluded that Soliz had 
two ruptured cervical discs. However, he did not 
recommend surgery since both he and Soliz felt the 
symptoms were not severe enough to warrant sur-
gery ( Exh. 7). There was no further evidence of 
3 
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further treatment by Dr. Bernson from that time up 
until the trial, one year later ( R. 210). 
On September 11, 1962 the plaintiff Soliz filed 
a Complaint naming plaintiff Edward Wilson Am-
merman as one of the defendants for recovery in the 
amount of $30,000.00 general damages and $1,000.00 
special damages. The defendant Farmers Insurance 
Exchange employed the law firm of Hanson & Gar-
rett to defend the action under the contract of insur-
ance (R. 198.) On January 18, 1963 the defendant 
notified Ammerman that he had the right to employ 
his own counsel to be associated with Farmers' coun-
sel in the defense of the suit (Exh. 12). Ammerman 
thereafter employed Mr. Reed Richards, an attorney 
practicing in Salt Lake City, to represent him in the 
action (R. 185). On September 27, 1962 Mr. Rich-
ards notified Farmers of the Complaint and ex-
pressed a desire that the Ammermans would not 
have to pay on any judgment (Exh. 4). And on 
September 16, 1963 Mr. Richards made demand 
upon Farmers to settle the case for $10,000.00 (Exh. 
5). However, Mr. Richards had indicated agreement 
with Farmers' counsel that the verdict would be 
around $2,500.00 to $5,000.00 (R. 229). At no time 
did he express an opinion as to the specific settle-
ment value of the case. At the time the case was sub-
mitted to the jury Mr. Richards expressed satisfac-
tion at the defense conducted by Farmers and ren-
dered the opinion that he did not think t~ere was 
any possibility of an excess verdict (R. 196A). 
4 
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On April 24, 1963 the plaintiff Soliz mailed to 
the defendants' counsel Answers To Interrogatories 
which contained a statement of the medical expenses 
incurred to that date and the amount of time off 
work, all of which amounted to special damages of 
approximately $450.00 ( R. 167). Also submitted 
pursuant to interrogatory was the medical report 
submitted by Dr. Bernson on December 8, 1962 
(Exh. 7, R. 319). Thereafter on April 29, 1963 the 
defendants' counsel took the deposition of Soliz 
(Exh. 14). 
Based upon the information acquired to that 
date, defendants' counsel on April 5, 1963 advised 
that liability was probable and recommended as a 
preliminary settlement value the amount of $6,-
000.00, it being a compromise between a $8,500.00 
value if Bernson were colTect and a $3,500.00 value 
if he were not correct ( Exh. 3). However, the eval-
uation was contingent upon what would be revealed 
by the independent medical examination which at 
that time had not been made (Exh. 3). Pursuant to 
the information and recommendation received from 
its counsel, the defendant Farmers put a value of 
$7,500.00 on the claim as it presently stood without 
a medical examination by another doctor (Exh. 9). 
However, final evaluation was deferred until an in-
dependent medical was obtained. Meanwhile Soliz 
had made an offer to settle the case for $9,000.00 
(R. 163), to which defendant countered with an offer 
of $4,500.00 (R. 165) before any independent med-
5 
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ical information \Vas obtained. Defendant's offer 
was rejected by the plaintiff Soliz. Further nego-
tiations did not take place until the day of the trial 
(R. 229), at which time Soliz offered to settle for 
the policy limits of $10,000.00. However, prior to 
that offer the defendant had had plaintiff Soliz 
examined and had received a report from Dr. Reed 
S. Clegg, an orthopedic surgeon, who examined Soliz 
shortly before the trial in September of 1963. After 
an extensive examination Dr. Clegg concluded that 
plaintiff Soliz showed no evidence of an interverte-
bral disc injury, but rather showed a moderate de-
generative condition of osteoarthritis, a chronic 
condition existing before the accident in question, 
which in his opinion would account for the symptoms 
of which Soliz complained before and after the acci-
dent ( Exh. 6). In light of this information and 
counsel's conclusion that Dr. Bernson's report was 
inconsistent - in that he reported no abnormality 
on the initial visit of Soliz and then when he did re-
port an abnormal condition he substantiated it with 
a discogram test which he himself said was admin-
istered without sufficient dye ( R. 224-225) - de-
fendant's counsel in his final evaluation dropped 
his evaluation of the case from $6,000.00 down to 
$3,500.00 (R. 205). Counsel noted that even if Bern-
son were completely believed he would place a top 
value at no more than $8,500.00 on the case ( R. 205). 
Plaintiff Soliz' offer remained at $9,000.00 
until the $10,000.00 offer was made at the time of 
6 
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trial. The case went to trial and both Dr. Clegg and 
Dr. Bernson testified. Defendant Farmers' counsel 
and plaintiff Ammerman's counsel both concluded 
that the evidence had gone well and that the verdict 
could not possibly exceed the policy limits (R. 196A). 
However, the jury brought back a verdict of $15,-
446.25. The policy limit of $10,000.00 plus interest 
was paid by the defendant after its appeal to this 
court (Soliz v. Ammerman, 16 Utah (2d) 11, 395 
Pac. ( 2d) 25) was unsuccessful. The remaining 
judgment was never satisfied. 
The present action was subsequently filed by 
the plaintiffs to recover the amount of the judg-
ment still owing. Plaintiff Eddie Soliz was present 
and represented by the law firm of Kipp & Charlier. 
The plaintiff Edward Wilson Ammerman did not 
appear at the trial and his counsel, Reed Richards, 
appeared only briefly but did not participate. 
On January 10, 1966 the case came up for 
trial before the Honorable A. H. Ellett. The court 
made three initial determinations to which the de-
fendant objected, to-wit: That the confidential re-
port from defendant's counsel to defendant was 
not privileged ( R. 14 7), that bad faith could be 
found from the refusal to settle for either $9,000.00 
or $10,000.00 (R. 146) and that the judgment credi-
tor, Eddie Soliz, was a proper party. 
The evidence in the trial was directed towards 
establishing the reasonable settlement value of the 
7 
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prior case and what othe1· defense attorneys would 
have clone in like circumstances. At this point it 
should be stated parenthetically that the elements 
of bad faith requfre more than a mere error in 
judgment deviating from what is conside1·ecl the 
reasonable settlement value. However, the evidence 
as outlined below appears to not even indicate a 
deviation from reasonableness and a fortiori no bad 
faith. 
The plaintiffs called as theil' first witness the 
defendant's claims manager, Russell J. Hadley. He 
testified as to the general history of the first case 
and as to his evaluations and negotiations. He stated 
that before the independent medical report was re-
ceived he had given an initial evaluation of $7,500.00, 
assuming Dr. Bernson's prognosis was confirmed 
(Exh. 9). He had made an offer of $4,500.00 based 
upon the assumption that there would be conflicting 
medical testimony and upon his experience that jurys 
tend to compromise the verdict where the medical 
testimony conflicts. His final evaluation was based 
on the two conflicting medical reports and, therefore, 
did not differ from his prior off er which was ground-
ed on an assumption of such conflict ( R. 189). His 
opinion did not change in favor of a higher value 
during the trial as he felt the evidence went better 
than expected ( R. 187), especially the testimony 
from Soliz that he had had low back pain and numb-
ness in his right arm prior to the accident ( R. 189). 
Plaintiffs' second witness was Don J. Hanson, 
8 
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defendant's counsel and a specialist in personal in-
jury defense work (R. 221). He outlined the pro-
cedure used in processing such defenses ( R. 222), 
which procedure was followed in the prior case ( R. 
224). He explained the initial phase as being pre-
liminary fact gathering on liability and damages. 
In this case he had the plaintiff's medical expenses, 
Dr. Bernson's report, the police report, other miscel-
laneous information gleaned from the plaintiff by 
interrogatories and information obtained from the 
defendant. With this he arrived at a preliminary 
evaluation of the case of $6,000.00 based substan-
tially upon Dr. Bernson's report ( Exh. 3). He found 
that Dr. Bernson's report was rathrr indefinite in 
that the initial examinations and x-rays indicated 
no injury and that the unequivocal conclusion of Dr. 
Bernson was based upon an inconclusive test and 
upon the subjective symptoms of Soliz (R. 225). He 
placed a value of $8,500.00 on the case if Soliz did 
have two herniated discs, but he felt that an inde-
pendent medical would be necessary in order to place 
a final evaluation on the case (Exh. 3). If it were 
found that Soliz did not have two herniated discs the 
settlement value of the case, in his opinion, would be 
$3,500.00. Thus the preliminary evaluation was a 
compromise ( $6,000.00) between the two medical 
possibilities ( Exh. 3). The second phase of the de-
fense was to get further information, in this case 
an independent medical examination and the deposi-
tion of the plaintiff. The purpose of the second phase 
9 
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is to allow for changes in the preliminary evaluation 
if furthe1· information justifies such change ( R. 
223). Upon receipt of Dr. Clegg's report Mr. Han-
son felt such a change was called for, and therefore 
in his final evaluation put the settlement value at 
$3, 500. 00 ( R. 22 7) . Dr Clegg' s report not only ran 
contrary to Dr. Bernson's but also gave a reason 
for Soliz' symptoms, i.e. the chronic osteoarthritis 
condition which he found in Soliz' back. This, coupled 
with the inconsistencies in Bernson's report and the 
fact that Dr. Clegg is generally agreed to be a very 
forceful medical witness ( R. 252), was considered 
to be sufficient to lower the value of the case con-
siderably (R. 227). He also felt that the testimony 
as to Soliz' limited activities would support just as 
well the report of Dr. Clegg and, therefore, would 
not weigh in Soliz' interest ( R. 233). During the 
trial Mr. Hanson was of the opinion, as was Mr. 
Richards, attorney for Ammerman, that the evi-
dence was going well and that the verdict would 
be no more than $3,500.00 to $5,000.00 (R. 229, 
196A). He was never aware of any offer for less 
than $9,000.00 from Soliz (R. 229). 
Plaintiffs' first expert witness was Louis E. 
Midgley. He stated that in his opinion the settle-
ment value at the time of Dr. Bernson's report was 
$7,500.00 (R. 238), but he would have settled before 
trial for $10,000.00 rather than take the chance of 
trying it inasmuch as he felt the medical outlook 
had not changed after Dr. Bernson's report ( R. 117) 
10 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and it was his opinion that in cases of liability the 
jurys do not tend to compromise but tend to be-
lieve the attending physician ( R. 262). His com-
putations were based on a formula of "10 times the 
specials", which led him to the conclusion that the 
probable verdict would have been $15,000.00 since 
the "specials" were approximately $500.00 and the 
cost of the future operation was $1,000.00 (R. 239). 
However, he admitted that a possible operation was 
not a "special" and that if the specials were only 
$450.00 then the probable verdict would be $4,-
500.00 (R. 251). Mr. Midgley said that his evalua-
tion would be $2,500.00 to $3,000.00 if the jury 
believed Dr. Clegg (R. 241). However, he stated 
that although Dr. Clegg was an excellent witness, 
one of the best in the Salt Lake area ( R. 252), he 
felt there was only a "faint" chance that the jury 
would believe him since he had not seen Mr. Soliz 
as many times as Dr. Bernson had ( R. 252-253), 
even though he personally felt that Dr. Clegg would 
be better informed of Soliz' con di ti on ( R. 255). 
However, he also stated that this favorableness to-
wards Dr. Bernson would be overcome if there was 
anything in the record to indicate that the plaintiff 
had been inconsistent in reporting his prior medical 
history (R. 249). When it was pointed out to him 
that Soliz had not disclosed his prior pains and 
treatment until the time of trial, he denied this as 
being important ( R. 267), although admitting that 
defendant's evidence had turned out very well on 
11 
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the issue of the pri01· condition ( R. 267). 
The plaintiffs' second expert witness was Mr. 
Tel Charlier, one of the attorneys for the plaintiff 
Soliz in both suits (R. 319). Mr. Charlier testified 
that it was his opinion that the reasonable settle-
ment value of the case would have been from $10,-
000.00 to $12,000.00 (R. 309) and that he would 
have settled for the amount that his firm had of-
fered, to-wit, $9,000.00 before trial and $10,000.00 
at the time of trial (R. 312). He enumerated the 
factors he would consider in coming to the valuation 
on plaintiffs' Exhibit 16. However, he also ad-
mitted that losing this action would be adverse to 
his own interests (R. 322). He also stated that de-
fendant had procured all the information the plain-
tiff had as to injuries, loss of wages, expenses and 
medical reports and, therefore, had before it as 
much information as did the plaintiff (R. 320). 
Defendant put on two expert witnesses who 
testified as to evaluations essentially the same as 
had Mr. Hadley, Mr. Hanson and Mr. Midgley, 
however differing with the latter as to their confi-
dence in going to trial with the case. The first wit-
ness was Gordon Strong, a specialist in insurance 
defense work whose work is about 60 % neck injuries 
(R. 280). In his opinion the settlement value of the 
case prior to trial was $5,000.00 to $6,000.00 (R. 
281). The facts upon which he based his opinion 
were: Probable liability ( R. 281) ; the report of Dr. 
Bernson and his prognosis that surgery was not im-
12 
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mediately i·equi1·ed (R. 282); Dr. Clegg's report; 
expenses of trial ( R. 285) ; expenses incurred ( R. 
290) ; the fact that no fusion had been accomplished, 
which in his opinion would cut down on the weight 
given pain, suffering and disability (R. 292); and 
the possible exposure of the insured to liability (R. 
293). He testified that the value of the case based 
on D1·. Be1·nson's report alone would be $7,500.00 (R. 
282) and $2,500.00 if Dr. Clegg's r12port were con-
sidered alone (R. 283). His conclusion was that the 
jury would p1·obably compromise at around $5,000.00 
to $6,000.00. However, he would have i-ejected an 
offer fo1· $9,000.00, and indicated that in regard to 
such an offe1· he would have indicated to the plain-
tiff that he would have to get down to around $5,-
000.00 before there could be a settlement (R. 296). 
He seriously doubted whethe1· any defense attorney 
would have recommended settlement for $9,000.00 
( R. 297) and would have been shocked at a verdict 
in excess of $10,000.00 (R. 289). 
Defendant's second witness was Harold Chris-
tensen, also a specialist in insurance defense work. 
He placed the settlement value of the case before 
trial at between $6,000.00 and $7,500.00 (R. 332). 
In his evaluation he considered the following factors: 
The actual out-of-pocket expense of the plaintiff (R. 
332) ; Dr. Bernson's report, which he considered to 
be too certain coming from a doctor who had not 
yet operated (R. 343); Dr. Clegg's report, which he 
concluded would be given more weight by the jury 
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due to D1·. Clegg's superior qualifications and ability 
as a witness ( R. 333-334) ; probable liability, which 
was not, however, a flagrant or aggravated case of 
negligence (R. 334); remoteness of an operation (R. 
345) ; and the tendency of jurys to compromise where 
there are conflicting claims ( R. 348). He unequivo-
cally stated that he would have rejected an offer for 
$9,000.00 prior to trial (R. 335) and the offer for 
$10,000.00 during trial (R. 336). He discounts the 
"treating physician" advantage to Dr. Bernson on 
the ground that he didn't consider him the treating 
doctor in this case since it appears that Dr. Smith 
was the treating physician ( R. 339). Mr. Christen-
sen also pointed out that in the "horse trading'' 
procedure that takes place in such cases some defense 
counsel and insurance companies will offer and coun-
ter-offer until a middle ground is found, whereas 
others will determine what the case is worth and 
offer to settle if the plaintiff will come down to that 
area, there being no single method in negotiating 
(R. 344). 
Mr. Charlier was recalled to the stand as a re-
buttal witness and testified in relation to a prior 
suit with Mr. Gordon Strong in order to impeach Mr. 
Strong as an expert witness. However, Mr. Charlier 
admitted that the facts were different from the pre-
sent case in that there were no issues as to the in-
cidence of the ruptured disc (R. 354) and that Mr. 
Strong's evaluation of that case had been proven cor-
rect at $9,500.00 (R. 354-355). 
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At the close of the evidence the defendant moved 
for a directed verdict, which was denied. The jury 
returned a special verdict against the defendant. 
Subsequently the defendant moved for a new trial 
or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Both 
were denied. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AT 
THE CLOSE OF THE EVIDENCE, THE EVIDENCE 
BEING WHOLLY INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW TO ESTABLISH THE CLAIM OF BAD FAITH. 
The defendant contends that the verdict of bad 
faith is without any factual support and that it 
should be dismissed as a matter of law. The serious-
ness of the charge is apparent. The plaintiffs are 
seeking to hold the insurer liable for damages not 
covered by the insurance contract. In effect the plain-
tiffs are asking that an impossible burden be placed 
upon the defendant - that not only must it conduct 
the defense of any action against the insured as per 
the insurance contract but that it must be omniscient 
in its trial judgment. It is a well recognized rule of 
law that the insurer has a duty to conduct the de-
fense of the insured in good faith, giving equal con-
sideration to both interests, but the plaintiffs are 
asking for relief due to bad faith merely because the 
defendant refused to settle for the policy limits. 
Upon an examination of the law and the facts it is 
clear that neither contention can stand. 
Negligence is conceded to be an element of bad 
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faith, but negligence alone is not the standard of the 
insurer's duty. In an excellent survey of the cases 
concerning an insurer's good faith in 40 A.L.R. (2d) 
168 it is concluded that the "great majority" of 
the courts apply the "good faith test", while only 
a "few courts" apply the negligence test. The mod-
ern trend is that the tests of good faith and negli-
gence have coalesced, with negligence a consideration 
of whether bad faith was present. Nevertheless, a 
showing of bad faith is necessary. In numerous land-
mark cases the negligence test has been expressly 
rejected. Brown v. Guarantee Insurance Co., 155 Cal. 
App. (2d) 679, 319 Pac. (2d) 69 (1958); Baker v. 
Northwestern National Gas Co., 125 N. W. (2d) 370, 
22 Wis. (2d) 77 (1963); City of Wakefield v. Glove 
Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N.W. 643 (1929); 
Johnson v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 108 Vt. 
269, 187 Atl. 788 (1936). 
The trial court correctly adopted the bad faith 
test in this case, but incorrectly instructed the jury 
pursuant thereto, i.e. in Instructions 12 and 14 
wherein the court equates bad faith with the mere 
failure to settle within the policy limits. This is a 
novel question in Utah, although in Paul v. Kirk-
endall, 311 Pac. (2d) 376, 6 Utah (2d) 256 (1957) 
the court implied acceptance of the good faith test. 
The cases on this subject clearly indicate what 
factors are necessary for finding bad faith. In the 
landmark case of Brown ·v. Guarantee Insurance Co., 
supra, the court summed up the prior cases on bad 
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faith and laid down the following seven factors as 
the constituent parts of bad faith: 
1. Attempts by the insurer to get the 
insured to contribute to the settlement. 
2. Failure of the insurer to investigate 
the case sufficiently to ascertain the evidence 
against the insured. 
3. Rejection by the insurer of its agent's 
or attorney's advice. 
4. Failure of the insurer to inform the 
insured of the settlement offers. 
5. Participation by the insured by ac-
quiescing in the insurer's conduct of the de-
fense, or misleading the insurer as to the 
facts. 
6. The amount of financial risk each 
party is exposed to. 
7. The strength of the respective sides 
as to liability and damages. 
An examination of the evidence in this case shows 
that there is a clear lack of substantial evidence to 
support a finding against the defendant on any of 
the above seven factors. The first six factors can be 
dismissed summarily. 
1. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the 
record that the insurer made an attempt to have the 
insured contribute to the settlement. 
2. Negligent investigation isn't at issue here 
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since it was not alleged by the plaintiffs. However, 
even had it been alleged, the record clearly shows 
that the defendant made adequate investigation of 
the evidence against it. The plaintiffs' own attorney, 
Tel Charlier, testified that the defendant had obtain-
ed all the information that was known to them con-
cerning plaintiff's injuries, wage losses and expenses 
(R. 320). Defendant's attorney, Don J. Hanson, 
testified that he had given this case the same care 
he does all his cases ( R. 224), making a prelimin-
ary investigation with the help of the defendant and 
following that up with the final investigation and 
report ( R. 222) . There was no evidence otherwise 
presented which would indicate that defendant did 
not make a sufficient investigation of the case. 
3. There likewise is a dearth of evidence in the 
record that the defendant rejected its counsel's ad-
vice. While it is true that its attorney gave a prelim-
inary evaluation of $6,000.00 the defendant did not 
by any means reject such advice by offering $4,-
500.00. As indicated many times in the trial record, 
the offering of a given amount is part of the "horse 
trading" that goes on in such cases and thus is not 
usually meant as a final off er if the other side re-
sponds by lowering its offer. Both defendant and its 
counsel were aware that the value of the case could 
drop below even $4,500.00 depending upon the re-
sults of the independent medical examination. Thus, 
prudence would dictate against offering the full pre-
liminary evaluation amount when it could be subject 
to considerable change downward. 
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In 40 A.L.R. (2d) 168 cases are cited where 
rejection of the attorney's advice was the primary 
basis of bad faith. However, in those cases the at-
torneys had usually made repeated warnings to the 
insurer to settle at an amount presently acceptable 
by the plaintiff because of their prognosis that the 
verdict would exceed the policy limits. That is far 
from the present case. Here the record fails to indi-
cate any disagreement between the defendant and 
its attorney about whether or not to settle the case. 
It must be remembered that defendant is guilty of 
bad faith here only if it had knowledge or reason to 
believe that the verdict would exceed the policy limits. 
The fact that the defendant offe1·ed in its initial 
bargaining offer $4,500.00 rather than the $6,000.00 
recommended as an eventual settlement figure is of 
no relevance in ascertaining the ultimate issue here 
for two reasons : First, there was no evidence that 
defendant would not have settled for $6,000.00 had 
the plaintiff showed an inclination to descend from 
his $9,000.00 offer. It should be noted that the plain-
tiff at no time offered to settle within even the upper 
range of value set by defendant and its attorney as-
suming Dr. Clegg's report was given no weight. Sec-
ondly, defendant cannot be guilty of bad faith to-
wards the insured unless in its bargaining process 
it contemplated a verdict in excess of the policy limits. 
If the defendant honestly believed, for example, that 
the verdict would not be over $5,000.00 but acted 
with reckless disregard of its own rights in not ac-
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cepting an offer for $4,000.00, the insured could not 
claim bad faith for at no time did the insurer know-
ingly endanger the insured's interests, but rather 
endangered its own interests. The defendant in the 
present case was merely being prudent in keeping its 
initial offer within the scope of what the final evalu-
ation would support. There obviously was not any 
substantial evidence upon which to base an adverse 
finding against the defendant. 
4. There was not a scintilla of evidence in the 
record that the plaintiff Ammerman or his attorney, 
Reed Richards, were not informed of the settlement 
offers. What evidence was introduced showed that 
Ammerman's attorney was present when the $10,-
000.00 offer was made on the first day of trial. 
5. The factor of the insured's acquiescence not 
only works in the defendant's favor by vitiating bad 
faith but also presents an absolute defense to the 
action. This is not a case where the insured was 
without counsel of his own choosing and thus de-
pendent upon the insurer's counsel, but rather in 
this case Ammerman had his own attorney who was 
present at the pre-trial hearings and at the trial. 
Ammerman's counsel made no objection to the con-
duct of the defense nor to the refusal of the offers 
of settlement. In fact he praised defendant's counsel 
for the good job done in defending the action (R. 
196A). True, he sent the standard demand for set-
tlement to the defendant, but at no time does the evi-
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dence disclose his dissent to any of the defendant's 
decisions. 
Plaintiff Ammerman is in an inconsistent posi-
tion. He was fully represented in the defense of the 
action - yet he now seeks to hold the defendant ac-
countable for the manner in which the defense was 
made, clearly an estoppel situation. In Royal Transit 
v. Central Surety & Insurance Corp., 168 Fed. (2d) 
345 (CA 7th Wis. 1948) the court said it was dif-
ficult to see how the insurer in any case could be 
guilty of bad faith in refusing to make a settlement 
when such ref us al was agreed to or joined in by the 
insured. And in New Orleans & C. R. Co. v. Mary-
land Casualty Co., 114 La. 153, 38 So. 89 the court 
said that the insured would have to prove not only 
that it urged the acceptance of the compromise 
and protested against defending the suit but that it 
absolutely declined to have anything to do with the 
defense; and that if such were not shown the insured 
was barred from recovery. And in Lawson & Nelson 
Sash & Door Company v. Associated Tnde1nnity Corp. 
204 Minn. 50, 282 N.W. 481 at 48:1-484 the court 
held, in affirming a directed verdict for the insurer: 
"We think defendant's conduct of the 
case from beginning to end bespeaks good faith 
on its part and that it acted upon reasonable 
grounds in proceeding as it did. After all, the 
probabilities and even the possibilities were as 
well known to the plaintiff as to the defendant. 
Both parties had full knowledge of all the 
facts. Plaintiff's proof does not even suggest 
that it was misled by reason of any suppres-
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sion of facts on the part of the defendant nor 
of any fraud being practiced by it. The most 
that can be said about the whole situation 
retrospectively is that Mr. Watson's judgment 
was better than that of Mr. Sawyer's ... " 
The same rule obviously applies to plaintiff Soliz 
who, if validly a party to the action, is subject to the 
rights and limitations existing between the defen-
dant and plaintiff Ammerman. 
The evidence when viewed most favorably to 
the plaintiffs discloses Ammerman's approval of the 
defendant's conduct of the defense, including the re-
jection of the settlement offers, and thus bars both 
plaintiffs from recovering for alleged bad faith in 
connection with such defense. For this reason alone 
the trial court was obligated to direct a verdict in 
defendant's favor. 
6. The factor of financial risk is an inchoate 
factor because it usually is of importance only where 
some of the other elements of bad faith are estab-
lished. In essence what the courts are requiring is 
that the interests of the insured should not be aban-
doned merely because the insurer faces the prospect 
of full loss. Southern Fire and Casualty Co. v. Norris, 
35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W. (2d) 785 (1952). An 
examination of the cases in 40 A.L.R. (2d) 168 shows 
no correlation between amounts of risk per se and 
bad faith. In the present case the amount of risk 
to both parties, when considered from the viewpoint 
of what was claimed and what the defendant thought 
the case was worth, is clearly not unreasonable. The 
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defendant had a right to look after its own interests. 
There is no rule of law that the insurer must auto-
matically pay the policy limits merely to protect the 
insured from possible liability. The insurer has a 
duty to consider the interest of the insured equally 
with that of its own, but has no duty to sacrifice its 
own interest. The general rule is that the insured 
must give equal consideration to both interests, not 
sole consideration to the interests of the insured. See 
Brown v. Guarantee l'nsu1·ance Co., supra, and 40 
A.L.R. (2d) 168. The California Supreme Court in 
Hodges v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 18 Cal. 
Rptr. 17, 24, 198 Cal. App. (2d) 564 (1961) cor-
rectly expresses the respective rights as: 
"To extend liability based upon bad faith 
to include every case where an insurer rejects 
an offer of settlement below policy limits, re-
gardless of the exercise of its honest judg-
ment, is not necessary for the adequate pro-
tection of the insured's interests under the 
policy. The effect of such extension would be 
only to permit the injured plaintiff to hold the 
insurance carrier for the full amount of any 
verdict or judgment and without reference to 
the amount of the insurance carried or pur-
chased by the insured. . ." 
The test was set down in Larson v. Anchor Cas-
ualty Co., 82 N.W. (2d) 376, 384, 249 Minn. 339 
(1957), to-wit: 
"The insurer is under no duty to com-
promise a claim for the sole benefit of its in-
sured if to continue the fight offers a fair and 
reasonable prospect of escaping liability under 
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its policy or of getting off for less than the 
policy limit. .. " 
In that case the settlement offer was $8,500.00 and 
the verdict was for $62,000.00, but the court found 
no bad faith because the insurer had reasonable and 
probable cause for rejecting the offer of settlement. 
The amounts in the present case are not nearly as 
extreme and, therefore, the same conclusion is more 
easily arrived at. The evidence in the present case 
discloses that all of the witnesses but one put a value 
on the case at no higher than $8,500.00, assuming Dr. 
Bernson's prognosis to be correct and discounting 
completely D1·. Clegg's findings. Mr. Charlier put a 
value of $10,000.00 to $12,000.00 on the case, but his 
interest in the case alone should be sufficient to re-
duce considerably the weight of his testimony. It 
has been held that although an attorney with an in-
terest in the case is competent to testify, little weight 
should be given to it. Johnson v. Nevenhoi·en, 100 
N.E. (2d) 60, 344 Ill. App. 125 and Jonas i'. Meye1·s, 
101 N.E. (2d) 509, 410 Ill. 213 (1951). 
M1·. Midgley, plaintiffs' other expert witness, 
gave his opinion as to the settlement value before 
trial, based on Dr. Bernson's report, at $7,500.00 
( R. 238). He indicated, however, that he would have 
settled for the policy amounts rather than take the 
risk of trying the case. He based this apprehension 
upon his belief that the jury could return a verdict 
in the amount of ten times the special damages, which 
he computed to be $1,500.00. However, he admitted 
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on cross examination that $1,000.00 of the special 
damages figure represented an item not properly 
considered as a special damage, i.e. the cost of an 
operation which had not yet been performed nor 
prescribed. Mr. Midgley agreed that if the damages 
were limited to the $500.00 which had been proved, 
by this theory the probable verdict would be approxi-
mately $5,000.00. Mr. Midgley, therefore, essentially 
agreed with the other four witnesses who put their 
upper value at between $8,500.00 and $6,000.00 
based on Dr. Bernson's report alone. This evidence 
clearly establishes the fact that an evaluation with 
an upper limit of $8,500.00 was in this case reason-
able and honest, as was also the dropping of that 
upper limit to between $3,500.00 to $6,000.00 when 
Dr. Clegg's findings became known. 
As Mr. Christensen pointed out in his testi-
mony, many times lawyers can agree as to the value 
of a case, as in cases of conflicting medical opinions, 
by assuming that a jury will try to compromise to 
the middle ground ( R. 348) . 
It appears obvious from the record that all the 
experts but one agreed generally as to the value of 
this case, all of which were under the policy limits 
even when considering Dr. Bernson's report alone. 
It hardly can be said that the defendant acted in 
bad faith in not settling for the policy amount 
when its honest and reasonable evaluation of the 
case was considerably lower than the policy amount. 
The contrariness of this particular verdict is em-
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phasized by the fact that all the witnesses, includ-
ing Mr. Charlier, were proven to be wrong in their 
appraisals of the case. However, recovery for bad 
faith must be bottomed on a foundation other than 
mere mistake in judgment, or even upon negligent 
judgment. Rather there must be a showing that the 
insurer acted dishonestly or fraudulently or with 
such marked disregard to the realities of the situ-
ation that bad faith is necessarily inferred. Defen-
dant asserts that the evidence does not substantiate 
a finding that defendant took even an unreasonable 
risk with its insured's interest, let alone an aban-
donment of those interests. 
7. The relative strength of each side of the case 
is the most important element in this case, as in most 
other cases, for it involves the state of mind of the 
defendant as to the strength of its case and to the 
probable consequences of asserting that case. The 
courts in applying this factor have generally de-
manded only that the insurer honestly believe it has 
a good case, not that it in fact does. The courts have 
been hesitant to interpose their hindsight in place 
of the insurer's judgment. In Hodges v. Standard 
Accident Ins. Co., supra, the court said, in reversing 
a finding of bad faith: 
"The art of appraising a case is, of 
course, not an exact science and there is room 
for variety of honest judgments. The insurer 
must appraise the case prior to the trial upon 
its general experience and the insurer should 
not be penalized for its failure to predict ac-
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curately the action of a jury ... 
". . . We do not believe the test of bad 
faith should be determined by hindsight. Ex-
perience shows that in looking ahead no one 
can predict what any particular jury will do." 
In that case the insurer believed that, even assuming 
liability, the damages would be not more than $3,-
500.00. The offer to settle was for $5,000.00. The 
verdict was for $35,000.00. In the finding no bad 
faith, the court said if the insurer "sincerely believed 
any probable verdict would be substantially less than 
$10,000 then it was not in the position of playing or 
gambling with the interests of the insured". (Supra, 
at 24) 
The facts as conceded above do show an honest 
mistake in judgment by everyone concerned. How-
ever, there is no evidence in the record that either the 
defendant or its attorney acted contrary to their 
honest and reasonable evaluation of the settlement 
value of the case. At most the record merely shows 
that the defendant had an opportunity to settle the 
case within the policy limits and refused to do so 
upon the belief derived from experience that the 
jury would compromise between the two medical 
witnesses, especially where the collateral evidence 
substantiates either one of the medical prognoses.The 
testimony of the witnesses in the present action con-
firms that the defendant was not operating under 
unreasonable optimism. Both Mr. Strong and Mr. 
Christensen unequivocally stated that they would 
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not have settled the case at any time for $9,000.00 
or $10,000.00. Mr. Strong, a veteran of many years 
of personal injury defense practice, stated that he 
would have been shocked by a verdict above the policy 
limits. (R. 289). The fact that the witnesses were 
also proved wrong is not the point. The point is that 
the defendant def ended this action under what has 
been established by the record as a reasonable prog-
nosis, it being in accordance with what other experts 
in this field would have done under like circum-
stances. 
This court in its opinion on the appeal of the 
first action ref erred to the question of damages as a 
"sharp disagreement between the medical testimony 
of the plaintiff's and defendants' doctors concerning 
the meaning and effect of what the x-rays show". 
Soliz v. Am11ierrrwn, supra. In his dissent Justice 
Callister said, "There was serious dispute among the 
expert witnesses as to the proper interpretation of 
the various x-ray films". (Supra at 28) This obvi-
ous conflict was known fully to the defendant. De-
fendant knew that Dr. Bernson had found no abnor-
mality in his first examination of Soliz and in the 
x-rays taken by Dr. Winters on two different occa-
sions (Exh. 7), and that when he finally did conclude 
that Soliz had two ruptured discs he relied upon a 
discogram which he admittedly administered with 
insufficient dye (R. 225). Defendant knew at the 
trial that Soliz had complained of low back pain and 
numbness in his right arm prior to the accident in 
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question (R. 263). Defendant was aware of the 
fact that the independent medical examination which 
was made a year after Dr. Bernson's last examin-
ation had found no trace of a ruptured disc, had 
found a chronic degenerating condition of osteo-
arthritis which was in no way connected with the 
accident. Defendant knew, as did plaintiff's own 
witness (R. 252) that Dr. Clegg was a more forceful 
and more effective medical witness than Dr. Bernson. 
Defendant knew that Dr. Bernson had not prescribed 
corrective surgery since the symptoms did not justify 
it (Exh. 7), and thus the cost of an operation would 
not be included in the special damages. And def en-
dant also knew that liability was probable and took 
that into consideration in its evaluation (R. 201). 
And from his deposition and answers to interroga-
tories the defendant knew the expenses claimed by 
Soliz from loss of wages and medical expenses. 
Collating this information with its experience, 
defendant concluded that in such a case the jury 
would probably compromise the damages between 
what it felt the damages were solely under Dr. Bern-
son's report and those solely under Dr. Clegg's report. 
Both Mr. Strong and Mr. Christensen confirmed this 
belief that the jury would compromise ( R. 283, 348), 
and both stated that they would not have settled at 
any time for $9,000.00 or more (R. 283, 284, 335, 
336). There was no evidence that plaintiff, even in 
response to defendant's initial offer, ever lowered his 
offer from $9,000.00. 
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Can it reasonably be concluded upon any basis 
that defendant acted dishonestly or fraudulently by 
not taking an offer higher than the value ascribed to 
the case assuming no contrary medical testimony 
from an independent medical exambation? Clearly 
not. Yet the plaintiff has presented no other evidence 
relevant to the issue of bad faith. ·when plaintiffs 
rested their case they had merely proved that they 
made an offer near the policy limits, which offer was 
rejected by a lower counter-offer. They failed to even 
bring up the other elements of bad faith herein dis-
cussed simply because there was no evidence to sup-
port them. 
When the defendant rested its case it had shown 
that the rejecting of the offer to settle for the policy 
limits was not only reasonable under the circum-
stances but was the prudent course to follow. With 
the evidence in that posture the trial court should 
have granted defendant's request for a directed ver-
dict. 
The recent cases on the subject of bad faith 
indicate that much more must be shown by the plain-
tiffs than was shown below in order to present a tri-
able issue of bad faith for the jury. In Frank B. Con-
net Lurnber Co. v. New Anisterda11i Casualty Co., 
236 Fed. (2d) 117, 127 (CA 8th 1956) the court af-
firmed a directed verdict against the plajntiff in-
sured on the basis that 
" ... where the evidence is conflicting or gives 
rise to conflicting inferences (it) does not, in 
our opinion, justify a finding of bad faith." 
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There the policy limit was $15,000.00 and the 
offer was $12,500.00. The verdict was for $35,-
000.00. The doctor for the plaintiff testified that 
the plaintiff had incurred a ruptured intervertebral 
disc and required surgery. The defendant's doctor 
testified that his x-rays showed no evidence of such 
injury. The court said that to allow the insured to 
prevail under such circumstances, where the insurer 
justifiably believed the action to be without merit, 
would be to grant unlimited coverage on a limited 
coverage policy. The situation there is clearly anal-
agous with the present case. 
In the case of Murach v. Massachusetts Bonding 
And Insurance Co., 339 Mass. 184, 158 N.E. (2d) 
338 (1959) the situation was again very similar. 
There the policy limit was $10,000.00 and the offer 
after the second trial was $9,300.00. The verdict was 
$29,000.00. The plaintiff claimed that she had lost 
her sense of smell and had suffered a fractured 
skull due to the accident. The insurer admitted lia-
bility, but alleged no skull fracture. The court said 
the test to be applied was whether the insurer consid-
ered the offer as it would had there been no policy 
limit. In affirming a finding of no bad faith the 
court said 
"It appears from the record that the in-
surer caused detailed investigations to be 
made into both the circumstances of the acci-
dent and the facts relative to damage. These 
investigations tended to corroborate the claim-
ant's contention that she had lost her sense 
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of smell as a result of the accident, but as to 
the seriousness of the othe1· injuries medical 
opinion was divided, and the insurer's infor-
mation was that the claimant had not sus-
tained a fracture of the skull as a result of 
the accident." (Supra, at 341) 
Thus, where the medical opinion is divided over 
the extent and cause of the damages it would appear 
that there is no bad faith unless the insurer has acted 
dishonestly or fraudulently. This test of bad faith is 
clearly expressed in the following cases. 
In Olson v. Union Fire lnsumnce Co., 118 N.W. 
(2d) 318, 174 Neb. 375 (1962) the Supreme Court 
of Nebraska reversed the trial court's refusal to 
not grant a directed verdict for the insurer. The 
policy limit there was $10,000.00 and the verdict 
was for $50,000.00. The offer was for the policy 
limit. The suit was brought under the guest statute. 
The insurer said it honestly believed there was no 
gross negligence. The test of bad faith used by the 
court was 
" ... Bad faith implies dishonesty, fraud 
and concealment ... Neither mistaken judg-
ment nor unreasonable judgment is the equi-
valent of bad faith." (Supra, at 322) 
Using that test, the court found that the plaintiff 
insured had not established a prima facie case of bad 
faith by the insurer's refusal to settle within the po-
licy limits. In coming to that conclusion the court 
reasoned: 
"Whether or not the evidence was suf-
ficient to sustain a finding of gross negligence 
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was a close question as shown by the meticu-
lous care with which the facts were considered 
by the court in (the prior case) . Courts as well 
as attorneys sometimes differ on the law ap-
plicable to a given state of facts (citation omit-
ted). We find none of the elements of negli-
gence or bad faith existed in the making of 
these determinations. The conclusion of the 
insurance company that it had a valid defense, 
although wrong, is not in itself evidence of 
negligence or bad faith." (Supra, at 322) 
The rule could not be more clear as applied to 
the facts in the present case. Where none of the other 
factors of bad faith are present, and where there is 
no showing that the insurer's faith in its case was 
dishonest or fraudulent but was merely a close 
question of fact, the court should direct a verdict in 
favor of the insurer. Two recent cases are right on 
point. 
In Baker v. Northwestern National Gas Co., 
supra, the policy limit was $25,000.00 and the verdict 
was for $40,000.00. The insurer moved for a sum-
mary judgment which was refused. The Supreme 
Court remanded to the trial court to determine three 
issues raised by the amended complaint, to-wit, 
whether the insurer had been diligent in its investi-
gation; whether insured was informed of the possible 
excess; and whether the insured was informed of the 
settlement offers. But the court then went on to say 
"Therefore, if Baker (plaintiff) had 
grounded his cause of action against North-
western solely on the facts: ( 1) that North-
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western had rejected an offer by Walker to 
settle the latter's negligence action for the 
policy limit of $25,000.00; and (2) that the 
final judgment recovered by Walker against 
Baker and Northwestern was in excess of 
$40,000; Northwestern would have been en-
titled to summary judgment under the rule of 
the Maroney and Berk cases. The facts before 
the circuit court were not so limited ... " (Su-
pra, at 372) 
However, in the present case the facts are so 
limited in the complaint and in the record, merely 
alleging that the defendant had refused to settle and 
that the final judgment was in excess of the limit. 
Under the Wisconsin court's rule a directed verdict 
should be granted in the present case. The defendant 
recommends that the court adopt the rule used by 
the Wisconsin court, which is 
"It is not bad faith if counsel for an auto-
mobile liability insurer refuses to settle the 
claim of an injured person under the bona fide 
belief that the insurer might defeat the action 
or keep the verdict within the policy limits, 
and even though it may be that the insurer 
acted negligently, exercising poor judgment, 
it is not enough to show that the insurer acted 
negligently in deciding to litigate rather than 
to settle the case, bad faith being a species of 
fraud requiring clear, satisfactory and con-
vincing evidence to sustain a finding thereof." 
(Supra, at 372) 
The case of Radio Taxi Service, Inc. v. Lincoln 
Mutual Insurance Co., 157 A. (2d) 319, 31 N.J. 299 
( 1960) is even more explicit in its holding, applying 
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the rule recommended as dictum in the Baker case. 
The policy limit was $5,000.00 and the verdict was 
for $13,500.00. The offer was made before trial for 
$3,600.00. The trial court granted a dismissal to the 
insurer on the grounds that no jury question had been 
raised as to the insurer's acting in bad faith. This 
was a novel question before the New Jersey court, 
which adopted the bad faith test and affirmed the 
dismissal. The court gave these reasons for not allow-
ing the question to go to the jury: 
". . . There was a sharp issue as to the 
credibility of Mrs. Meyer's testimonial asser-
tion of her injury, and an equally sharp issue 
among the medical witnesses on the same sub-
ject. But more important, the proof provides 
substantial support for defendant's view when 
settlement was discussed that on all the cir-
cumstances of the case Mrs. Meyer's adjust-
ment demand of $3,600 should be rejected. 
"On the whole record we find nothing in 
the facts to warrant an inference sufficient to 
raise a jury question that the insurer did not 
exercise good faith in reaching the conclusion 
that Mrs. Meyer's case did not have a settle-
ment value of $3,600. . .. 
"The ultimate question is not whether a 
verdict in excess of the policy limits should 
have been anticipated, but whether the insurer 
lacked good faith in deciding not to meet the 
settlement demand. Mere failure to settle with-
in the policy limit when there was an oppor-
tunity to do so before or during trial is not 
evidence of bad faith .. 
"In this case, no facts were presented 
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which would warrant a finding that the de-
fendant was unduly venturesome at the ex-
pense of the insured, or that the danger of an 
adverse verdict in the accident case was so 
great as to create an inference of bad faith in 
rejecting the settlement offer, or that the de-
cision not to meet the settlement demand 
sprang from optimism unrelated to the reali-
ties of the case. In such a situation, to allow 
a jury to review the decision not to accept the 
settlement offer is to subject every such case 
where the verdict exceeds the policy limit to 
reappraisal by their uninformed judgment. 
Such a course would empty of significant con-
tent the contractual stipulation which places 
control of settlement in the hands of the insur-
er." (Supra, at 325, 326, 327) 
The rule is sound, and the policy argument is 
fair and logical. The insured should have to allege 
and show more than mere refusal to settle as a basis 
for bad faith. The insured contracted with the in-
surer for insurance only up to the policy limit. Had 
the insured wanted more protection it could have 
been obtained for a nominal amount. The point, 
therefore, is that the insured wants his cake and to 
eat it too. He wants the insurer to insure him up to a 
certain limit, defend all actions and then pay the 
excess merely because it refused to settle before trial 
where it honestly believed that it could prove the dam-
ages resulting from the accident to be less than the 
policy limit. 
The defendant contends, therefore, that under 
the above tests for bad faith the plaintiffs did not 
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raise substantial evidence in support of any of the ele-
ments of bad faith. The record shows, and this Court 
agreed, that the back injury and its cause was a close 
question. The defendant honestly believed that the 
jury would compromise the conflicting damage 
claims, which belief was affirmed by Mr. Strong, 
Mr. Christensen and Mr. Hanson. The optimism of 
the insurer was in line with the realities of the situa-
tion. The record fails to show even negligence or poor 
judgment. It merely shows a close question of injury 
which was decided in favor of the plaintiff Soliz for 
an amount in such excess above each witness' prog-
nosis that it can only be explained as a fruit of the 
vagaries within our jury system. However, as the 
cases point out, the case should not be submitted to 
the jury unless there is a clear question of fact with 
supporting evidence as to the constituent elements 
of bad faith, and not when the question is merely 
whether or not the insurer acted wisely or reasonably 
in refusing to settle for the policy limits. The unwar-
ranted danger to the insurer is obvious where the 
jury is given carte blanche in passing upon the techi-
cal matters of judgment involved in the negotiation 
and trial of a lawsuit in a context outside mere negli-
gence. In 40 A.L.R. (2d) 173 the commentator notes 
that where the jury is given such discretion the in-
surer has only a "tenuous chance" of escaping liabil-
ity in "any case" where a sizeable judgment results 
after the rejection of a settlement. Defendant merely 
asks that the court require bad faith to be proved as 
a matter of law rather than allowing a verdict of 
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bad faith to stand where the evidence at most shows 
a honest misjudgment as to what a particular jury 
would do. 
The probability of such a verdict was compound-
ed by the court's Instruction 12, wherein the court 
equates bad faith with merely the failure to settle 
within the policy limits when such an opportunity 
avails itself. The court instructed in part: 
"The only issue before you is whether or 
not defendant is liable to plaintiffs . . by 
reason of the fact that the defendant was 
guil~y of bad faith in that it failed to settle 
the Soliz claim prior to trial when it could do 
so for $9,000 or, when that offer was with-
drawn, at the trial, it failed to settle before the 
jury returned the verdict of $10,000." 
This instruction undoubtedly encouraged the jury to 
find against the insurer merely upon its refusal to 
settle, notwithstanding the defendant's good faith 
in such refusal. 
Defendant respectfully contends that the trial 
court erred in not granting defendant's motion for a 
directed verdict on the ground that plaintiffs were 
estopped due to their acquiescence in the defendant's 
conduct of the defense; and because the findings, 
when viewed most favorably to the plaintiffs, are, 
in the words of this Court ( Lemnwn v. D. & R. G. W. 
R., 9 Utah (2d) 195) "not supported by any sub-
stantial evidence, or the evidence is so clear that all 
reasonable minds would find one way, so that a ver-
dict contrary thereto must have resulted from passion 
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or prejudice, or niisconception of the law or the e?.:i-
de11ce, or in arbitrary disregard thereof." 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING IN-
TO EVIDENCE, OVER THE OBJECTION OF THE DE-
FENDANT, THE CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS 
BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT AND ITS ATTORNEY. 
The trial court, prior to trial, took under advise-
ment and denied defendant's objection to the intro-
duction into evidence of the confidential report sent to 
the defendant by its attorneys, Hanson & Garrett. 
The court reasoned that the material issue of this 
case revolved around what was contained in that re-
port. Therefore, it would be allowed in as evidence 
(R.147). 
It is the contention of the defendant that the 
communications between defendant's counsel and 
the defendant are confidential and privileged by 
Section 78-24-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953. That 
statute specifically states that a witness cannot be 
examined as to communications made between attor-
ney and client in the course of professional employ-
ment. It would naturally follow that this privilege 
would apply equally to documents containing such 
privileged communications. The court seemingly con-
strued Rule 30 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
as being applicable in this case when it allowed in 
evidence the communications on the ground that they 
were relevant to the material issue of the case. Surely 
the absolute privilege given in Section 78-24-8, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 is not to be emasculated by 
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such a broad reading of Rule 30 (b). However, even 
under Rule 30 (b) the communications would be un-
discoverable since the confidential report was a work 
product of the attorney, containing his conclusions 
as to the settlement value of the case, which are ex-
pressly covered by the statute: 
". . . The court shall not order the pro-
duction or inspection of any part of the writ-
ing that reflects an attorney's mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories. 
" 
There are a number of cases which expressly 
grant a privilege to such communications when made 
by the insurer's attorney to the insurer. 
In Farm, Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. 
Anderson, 360 S. W. (2d) 314 (Missouri, 1962) the 
court held a communication between insurer's attor-
ney and its branch claims manager in reference to 
contemplated litigation was privileged, but the court 
said it would not be if it had been a communication 
in the ordinary course of business. 
The case of Meleo System, v. Receivers of Trans 
America Ins. Co., 105 So. (2d) 43 (Alabama, 1958) 
involved an action in equity by receiver to accept a 
compromise settlement with a reinsurer. The credit-
ors of the insurer in receivership resisted the settle-
ment. An attorney for the receiver and one for the 
insurer assessed a value to each case, some of which 
were still pending, in order to get a compromise value. 
The receiver's attorney refused to answer, on exam-
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ination, as to the value given each case. The court 
sustained the lower court's ruling that the testimony 
was privilegd. 
In Continental Casualty Co. v. Pogorzelski, 82 
N.vV. (2d) 183 (Wisconsin, 1957) the insurer sued 
the insured to collect attorney fees for settling the 
claim against the insured. The insured requested the 
production of a letter from the attorney to the in-
surer which contained advice on the claims against 
the insured and the present action. The court refused 
to allow the production of such letter, it being privi-
leged. 
The case of General Accident Fire and Life 
Assurance Corp. Ltd. v. Mitchell, 259 Pac. (2d) 862 
(Colorado, 1953) was a garnishment action against 
the insurer. Prior to trial the lower court allowed 
the production of letters between the insurer's attor-
ney and the home office. The court said that the con-
tents of the letters showed a complete disregard for 
ethics and admissions which would seriously hamper 
the present defense, but held that despite its disap-
proval of the contents the letters were nevertheless 
privileged from production. 
In Ernerson v. Western Autonwbile Indrn. Asso-
ciation, 182 Pac. 647 (Kansas, 1919) a trustee in 
bankruptcy sued the insurer for indemnity of a judg-
ment of $2,500.00 which was obtained against the 
bankrupt insured, which judgment was never satis-
fied due to the bankruptcy. The court held that the 
insurer was not liable except as to amounts actually 
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paid by the insured. The trustee then claimed that 
the insurer's attorney had advised insured to take 
out bankruptcy. The lower court allowed evidence 
to show this communication. The court held this to 
be error, that the communications were privileged 
and such privilege was lost only if there were fraud 
involving moral turpitude. 
The defendant, by arguing this point, does not 
infer that the contents of the communication indi-
cated bad faith on the part of the insurer. However, it 
did contain information that the defendant's attor-
ney made a preliminary recommendation of $6,000.00 
as the value of the case. To the jury it obviously 
meant that the insured had disregarded its attorney's 
advice by offering $4,500.00 and, therefore, was evi-
dence of bad faith. It seems clear that the defendant 
was prejudiced in this action by the error of the trial 
court in violating the confidential communications 
between the attorney and client. 
It should be noted in this respect that Ammer-
man cannot claim here that he was also the client 
of defendant's attorney and has, therefore, given au-
thority to disclose such information. He had his 
own attorney and was in no way associated with de-
fendant's attorney on an employment basis. Defend-
ant concedes that had Ammerman had no attorney 
there may be reason to hold that Ammerman had 
adopted defendant's attorney as his own. This seems 
to be the usual situation where the courts have let 
in similar communications. However, in the present 
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case the communication was solely between defend-
ant and its attorney, as vvas also the employment 
relationship. 
The court obviously violated defendant's privi-
lege by ordering production of the documents, and 
their use as evidence in the ti·ial caused irreparable 
prejudice against the defendant in the minds of the 
jurors. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE 
PLAINTIFF SOLIZ FROM THIS ACTION, HE BEING 
WITHOUT ANY RIGHTS AGAINST THE DEFENDANT 
FOR AN AMOUNT IN EXCESS OF THE POLICY 
LIMITS. 
Defendant contends that Soliz was an improper 
party in this suit and prejudicial error was commit-
ted by the trial court in allowing Soliz to prosecute 
the action. The case file and transcript of the record 
show that Soliz' attorneys were the only active par-
ticipants for the plaintiffs in the pleading, discovery 
and trial stages. Ammerman's attorney did not par-
ticipate in the pre-trial conference, in the various 
hearings of motions before the court or in the trial 
of the action. 
The rule applicable to this issue has been clearly 
defined by this Court, as well as many others. In 
Paul v. Kirkendall, supra, the court expressly held 
that the judgment creditor had no rights in a gar-
nishment action against the insurer for its alleged 
bad faith in not settling the prior suit within the 
policy limits. Although the action here is a direct 
43 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
suit and not a garnishment action, the pl'inciples 
enunciated by this Coul't would appea1· to be equally 
applicable. The Coul't pointed out in the Paul case 
that an action against an insul'el' for bad faith was 
an unliquidated tort claim and, therefore, the cause 
of action belonged only to the insured. The court 
noted this result if the judgment creditor were al-
lowed to prosecute the garnishment action: 
" ... To do so compels the garnishee to 
enter into combat with an adversary other 
than its insured and battle with one who had 
nevel' had any contract relation with him." 
(Supra at 260) 
This reasoning applies equally to the present action 
where the defendant had to do battle with a pa1·ty 
having no contrnct relation to it. The various cases 
which have dealt with this specific issue have made 
it cleai· that without some special statute or provision 
in the insurance contract giving the judgment credi-
tor equal rights with the insm·ed the judgment credit-
or could not sue the insure1· for an amount in excess 
of the policy limits. 
In the recent case of Dillinglwni v. Tri-State In-
surcmce Co., 381 S.W. (2d) 914 (Tenn. 1964) the 
court pointed out that in the cases allowing the judg-
ment credito1· to sue the1·e was a pl'ovision in the in-
surance contract entitling the judgment creditor to 
i·ecove1· to the same extent that the insured could have 
had he paid the judgment. The court distinguished 
that provision from the one befo1·e it, which afforded 
the judgment Cl'editor the right to recover under the 
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policy to the extent of the insurance afforded. In 
reference to the former provision the court said: 
". . . Typical policies now in use do not 
contain this provision; in the absence of such a 
policy p1·ovision the courts have declined, as to 
the cause of action in excess of policy limits, to 
permit direct recovery by claimant against the 
company. The excess liability of the company 
arises out of the i·elationship between insured 
and company. Claimant is a stranger to that 
relationship. Not only is the company without 
any duty to claimant to accept claimant's rea-
sonable settlement off er, but also, if there is a 
sizeable disparity between the settlement offer 
and the amount of the judgment obtained in 
the trial which follows refusal of the offer, 
claimant is benefited rather than harmed by 
the company's refusal to settle. It therefore 
would be anomalous to permit claimant to re-
cover directly against the company in his own 
right (in the absence of a policy provision, 
such as the italicised phrase above, clearly 
having that meaning)." 
The court affirmed the dismissal of the action. 
The same rule has been applied in various other 
cases, towit: Frances Newlon, 75 Ga. App. 341, 43 
S.E. (2d) 282 (1947); Duncan v. Luniberrnan's Mu-
tual Casualty Co., 91 N.H. 349, 23 A. (2d) 325 
(1941); Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Hicks Rubber 
Co., 140 Tex. 586, 169 S.W. (2d) 142 (1943); Chit-
tick i·. State Fann Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 170 F. 
Supp. 276 (DC Del.); Murray 'V. Mossman, 355 Pac. 
(2d) 985, "\iVash.; Wesing v. American Indemnity 
Co., 127 F. Supp. 775 (DC Mo.). 
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There have been several cases allowing the 
judgment creditor to maintain a bad faith action, but 
those cases involve either a provision similar to the 
one referred to and distinguished in the Dillingham 
case, supra, Auto. Mutual lndeninity Co. v. Shaw, 
134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 ( 1938) or an assignment 
under a specific state statute allowing tort claims to 
be assigned, Communale v Traders & General Ins. 
Co., 50 Cal. (2d) 654, 328 Pac. (2d) 198. 
The provision in the present case is similar to 
that which was before the Dillingham court, it merely 
gives the judgment creditor a right to recover against 
the insurer subject to the terms and limitations of 
the policy. The provision reads: 
"(6) ACTION AGAINST THE COMPANY 
. . . As respects the insurance afforded 
under Coverages A and B, whenever 
judgment is secured against the insured 
or the executor or administrator of a de-
ceased insured in an action based upon 
bodily injury, death, or property dam-
age, then an action may be brought 
against the Company on the policy and 
subject to its terms and limitations, by 
such judgment creditor to recover on the 
. d " JU gment ... 
Thus Soliz was not assigned under the contract 
itself the right to recover for bad faith of the insurer, 
nor can he claim rights under an assignment from 
Ammerman for two reasons: First, there was no 
such assignment from Ammerman; and, secondly, 
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such a tort claim is not assignable in Utah. See Mayer 
v. Rankin, 91 Utah 193, 63 Pac. (2d) 611. 
The prejudice resulting to the defendant from 
this error was substantial. Soliz' atto1·neys in the 
present action were the firm of Kipp & Charlier, who 
had also tried the original suit for the plaintiff. In 
the trial the court repeatedly admonished counsel that 
this suit was not to be a retrial of the original action. 
However, the record is replete with inquiry by Soliz' 
counsel as to the details of Soliz' injuries, his inability 
to perform his job and other activities and the medi-
cal treatment he received-thus a retrial of issues 
now irrelevant in deciding defendant's good or bad 
faith. Additional prejudice was engendered by the 
absence of Ammerman throughout the trial and the 
presence of Soliz at the counsel table as a party plain-
tiff, thereby impressing upon the jury that what they 
were really deciding was whether the injured plain-
tiff should get what a prior jury had awarded him. 
It appears obvious that under such circumstances 
the jury could not objectively weigh the claim of bad 
faith when it appeared that they were redetermining 
the prior case with the same contending parties-
Soliz as plaintiff and Farmers defending. In a bad 
faith case the trial court must take every precaution 
to prevent the retrial of the prior cause of action and 
limit the inquiry into the elements of bad faith. The 
trial court here failed to prevent such appearance by 
allowing Soliz to prosecute the action. 
The defendant, therefore, contends that the 
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plaintiff Soliz was an improper party in this action 
for two reasons: First, he had no rights by assign-
ment or otherwise over and above the policy amount; 
and, secondly, he suffered no damage since had the 
insurer settled for the $9,000.00 amount Soliz would 
have received $1,000.00 less than he has already col-
lected. The error of the trial court was clearly preju-
dicial to the defendant and, therefore, a new trial 
should be granted if the Court denies the relief pray-
ed for under Point I. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented in this case was woefully 
lacking in proof of the basic elements of bad faith. 
The defendant has no quarrel with the application of 
the bad faith standard to its defense of cases. How-
ever, the defendant believes that in the present case 
the court did not adequately consider the evidence 
before submitting it to the jury. This was not merely 
a question of negligence which offers an expansive 
field of consideration by the jury. It was rather an 
inquiry as to whether certain narrowly defined ele-
ments of bad faith were present. It has been pointed 
out clearly by the many courts facing this problem 
that bad faith is composed of a fraudulent intent 
or dishonesty. In order to have a prima facie case 
of bad faith there must be substantial evidence that 
such intent was present. The jmy should not be 
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allowed to speculate as to the insurer's intent merely 
upon evidence that an offer was made and rejected. 
However, in the present case the jury was allowed 
to speculate upon such evidence, notwithstanding 
a complete lack of evidence that the insurer had ex-
hibited any of the objective elements of bad faith 
set out in the Brown case as being essential to a 
finding of bad faith. An examination of the cases 
in 40 A.L.R. (2d) 168 where bad faith has been 
found will disclose that there was objective proof 
of the insurer's dishonesty, not merely proof that 
an off er was made which, when viewed retrospec-
tively, would have been accepted. The plaintiff may 
have shown a prima facie case of mistake, but has 
failed to establish any evidence going beyond that 
point to an establishment of fraudulent or dishonest 
intent. In light of this clear lack of evidence and 
defendant's absolute defense based on Ammerman's 
acquiescence in the conduct of the defense, def end-
ant respectfully petitions the Court to reverse the 
judgment of the lower court and fnter judgment 
that as a matter of law plaintiffs failed to establish 
a prima facie case of bad faith. 
In the event the Court does not grant the above 
relief, the defendant submits that a new trial is 
necessary in order to cure the prejudicial errors 
committed by the trial court in allowing the plain-
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tiff Soliz to prosecute this action without any rights 
against the defendant and in allowing in as evi-
dence confidential communications between defend-
ant and its counsel. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
520 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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